Since the so-called oil crisis of 1973, which marked the end of the era of cheap oil controlled by consumers rather than producers, the leaders of the most developed capitalist economies have become aware of the need to form a political system and economic capable of defending the interests of the bloc in the face of what seemed to be an unstoppable desire for autonomy and decision-making power on the part of the colonies and the countries of the periphery. In reality, it is the United States which is the clearest on the need for this space of self-defense for the richest countries, and this is why, as usual, it was France which, in 1975 , with the Rambouillet declaration, presented the proposal as something shared by all.

To strengthen Anglo-Saxon weight in the forum, the United States invited Canada to participate, and in exchange, to compensate France and Germany, the European Commission was also invited to the annual meetings. It is true that in 1975, among the capitalist economies, Brazil had an industrial production capacity greater than that of Canada, but the choice of the seventh partner is not trivial: it was a question of reinforcing the predominance of the vision Anglo-Saxon society of the world, in coordination with those closest to it. partners in their interests and their approach to international affairs, in the case of the richest and most industrialized countries on the planet. In 1998, they wanted to join Russia, even though it had gone from being the second industrial power after the United States in 1975, when it was the USSR, to having an industrial GDP similar to that of the Austria or Thailand. As we know, the collusion was short-lived: once Russia showed that it wanted to go it alone and have its own international agenda.

Shortly after, in 1999, the G20 was created, a new forum which brought together the partners of the G7/8 and the main industrial economies of other continents. The participation of Saudi Arabia in this forum, and not Malaysia, Thailand or Iran, may attract attention in purely quantitative terms, economic weight, etc., but the central role played by Saudi Arabia is obvious (even if it seems to be less and less so). …in Middle East strategy and American oil geopolitics.

The fact that Spain is permanently invited to the G20 is one of the rare milestones of Spanish foreign policy in recent decades – although some insist on giving the feat more to Sarkozy than to Zapatero, for being the one who gave way to Spain. in November 2008, holding both the French presidency and the pro tempore presidency of the EU. The G7, however, accounted for a higher percentage of global industrial production in 1999 (65%) than in 1975 (54%). It is obvious that the G20 is designed as an extension of the influence of the world vision held by the most developed and industrialized countries on the planet, a space for consultation on economic, financial and commercial aspects – this is not It is no coincidence that the forum was created shortly after the Asian crisis of 1997, which mainly affected South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia, and which led to a slowdown in capital accumulation in Southeast Asia and a consolidation of North American and Japanese capital in the region. A good time to share the “Western” view of the world with new members in a club less exclusive than the original.

But since then, the global economic landscape has changed significantly. Today, the G7 generates barely 35% of world industrial production, and China, which represented 3% in 1975 and 6% in 1999, of world industrial production, today has an industrial capacity similar to that of all the G7 countries combined.

It is for this reason that we have recently witnessed the attempt of BRICS, the club formed in the context of the 2007 financial crisis, to extend its influence by incorporating other countries which benefit little from the economic rules put in place. implemented during summits dominated by the West. , such as Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, or wishing to relocate in the new global economic scenario, such as Saudi Arabia (seeking greater political autonomy) or the Arab Emirates united (main logistical and commercial center of the “enemies”). of the West” in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa).

It is obvious that the economic, commercial and financial interests of the “Western” countries, which dominate the G20 in addition to the presence of the G7, with those of the EU, Australia, South Korea, Mexico or the Indonesia – and therefore of course Spain, as partner 21, no longer represents the majority of global economic activity. And therefore not political either: when in March 2014, while Australia was hosting the 2014 G20 summit in Brisbane, the Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs proposed (on her own initiative or at the suggestion of the party concerned) to ban Following the annexation of Crimea, the BRICS foreign ministers had to remind the Australian minister that “the leadership of the G20 belongs equally to all member states and that ‘no Member State can unilaterally determine its nature and character’.

The absence of the Russian and Chinese presidents at the recent G20 meeting symbolizes the ongoing institutional movements in a period characterized both by uncertainty about the future design of the normative and institutional rules of the world order, and by the certainty of this in less than a decade, the panorama will change radically.

The decision to incorporate the African Union into the G20 is part of the G7’s attempt to strengthen its influence in a key geographical area in the present and especially in the future. Even if Africa represents barely 2% of world industrial production or 3% of GDP, it has significant reserves of strategic raw materials, primarily oil, but also 80% of coltan reserves, an irreplaceable element in the production of electronic equipment, are in stock. DR Congo, a country which also has significant cobalt reserves with Rwanda; The uranium reserves of Niger, Namibia and South Africa exceed those of North America and any other region in the world except Australia. There are significant reserves in South Africa and other countries of chrome, copper, manganese, zirconium, iridium or platinum… just consider that the American military-industrial complex imports 50% of its raw materials from rare and non-ferrous metals and 75% of cobalt from Africa, to become aware of the geoeconomic importance of the continent.

But Africa’s greatest potential wealth lies in its population, in a context of accelerated aging in most regions of the world. In Europe, half of the population is already over 43; it is estimated that in fifty years the median will be around 50; In North America, half of the population is currently over 37, and in half a century it will be over 45; in Asia, half of the population is already over 32 years old and in fifty it will be over 44 years old. While Latin America’s labor reserve is depleting, because due to migration, in half a century half of the population will go from over 31 to 46, Africa remains the large reserve of labor: half of the population is currently under 20 years old and in half a century, half will still be under 30 years old.

It remains to be seen whether the gesture of inviting the AU to participate in the G20 will have a significant change in the geopolitics of the region, since since China has established itself as the main economic partner of most African countries, some countries of the continent have experienced the highest rates of economic growth in the world. Over the last decade, after Asia (4.4% annual average), Africa is the continent that has experienced the strongest growth (2.6% annual average), slightly more than Oceania (2.5%) and far ahead of the Americas (1.7%) and Europe. (1.5%). What the best the West/G7 can offer, we do not know at the moment. I

Professor of political economy at UPV/EHU